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Abstract. The last ten years have seen a tremendous increase in the number of student-built spacecraft projects;
however, the main outcome of these programs has been student training and, on some occasions, extremely low-cost
space access for the university science community. Because of constrained resources and an inherently-constrained
development team (students), universities have not been in a position to develop 'disruptive' space technologies; in
order to secure launches, they are forced to build low-capability, high-margin systems using established design
practices.
However, universities have one inherent advantage in developing 'disruptive' space systems: the freedom to fail.
Experimental failure is a basic element of university life, and from the university's perspective a failed spacecraft is
not necessarily a failed mission. Because of this freedom, universities can take risks with spacecraft that no sensible
professional program would dare attempt. The tremendous reduction in the size and cost of electronics are making
possible 'disposable' spacecraft that function for only weeks, but whose very low cost and short development cycle
make their launch and operation affordable. Universities are uniquely poised to take advantage of disposable
spacecraft, and such spacecraft could be used to develop 'disruptive' satellite technologies.
This paper briefly reviews the history of student-built spacecraft, identifying general trends in spacecraft design and
university capabilities. The capabilities and constraints of university programs are matched against these emerging
technologies to outline the kinds of unique missions and design methodologies universities can use to contribute to
the small satellite industry. Finally, this paper will provide examples of these 'disruptive' technologies.
This change in opportunity led to a very different type
of participation. In the first two categories, universities
participate as members of a larger development team,
receiving significant funding and significant
programmatic and technical assistance; they must also
make significant contributions towards the flight
mission. When a university opts to start a spacecraft
bus program, however, it often does so on its own with
only some (or no) assistance from government or
industry.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years, there has been an increase of
spacecraft production at schools around the world, with
30 university-built spacecraft launched. However,
despite the claims and expectations of many of these
new participants (the author among them), university
satellites have not “disrupted” industry practice in favor
of small spacecraft.
There are three ways in which universities typically
participate in space missions:
1.
2.
3.

However, as noted above, missions in this third
category have not revolutionized the space industry;
with a few notable exceptions, university-built
spacecraft have been low-cost, marginal-performance
vehicles.*
Students are, by definition, untrained
personnel, and thus a truly student-built spacecraft is
(and should be) subjected to particular scrutiny by a
professional launch provider and its paying customers.
Therefore, university spacecraft are forced to be lowcapability, high-margin systems following established
design practices. Similarly, if students are to be
involved in development, then the constraints of an
academic cycle force universities into low-performance,
short-duration missions. These constraints make it

As principal investigators for the science
experiments on board the spacecraft.
As technology developers for future spacecraft
components.
As spacecraft designers, integrators and
operators for a complete (usually schoolsponsored) mission.

Universities have primarily participated in the first two
categories. This is because of the historical research
role of universities and because, until recently,
spacecraft components were necessarily large and very
expensive. The electronics revolution at the end of the
20th century spilled over into spacecraft development,
giving universities the opportunity to build much
smaller vehicles at a much lower price.

*

A new, slightly pejorative, term has been coined to describe
these “no-payload” spacecraft: BeepSat.
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exceedingly difficult to develop systems that would
disrupt the current market for spacecraft.
However, despite these obstacles – or, more to the
point, because of these obstacles – university-class
spacecraft possess the ability to become “disruptive”
research platforms, introducing technologies and
practices to change both the small and large satellite
industries. Universities can pursue high-risk, highreward missions because their primary mission
(education) gives them greater tolerance for flight
failure. And, the tremendous reduction in the size and
cost of electronic components has introduced the
possibility of “disposable” spacecraft – systems that
function for only weeks or months, but whose very low
cost and development cycle make their launch and
operation affordable. Universities are uniquely poised
to take advantage of disposable spacecraft, and it is
such spacecraft that could be used to develop disruptive
technologies and missions.

strong
university
participation)
comes
from
programmatic issues, not cost or performance; while
university-class satellites have traditionally been lowcost and low-performance, this is a logical consequence
of the way the missions have proceeded, not an inherent
part of their nature. (In fact, there is a mistaken belief
that university-built spacecraft are a low-cost
alternative to “professional” satellites; this will be
further discussed, below.) The purpose of universityclass missions is to train students in the design,
integration and operation of spacecraft, and this is
accomplished by giving students direct control over the
progress of the program.

Before proceeding, three terms used in this paper
require careful definition.

Exclusion from the “university class” category does not
imply a lack of educational value on a project’s part,
not does it imply that such programs cannot contribute
to “disruptive” spacecraft development; this definition
is simply a way to limit the discussion in this paper to a
specific class of university missions. The author
recognizes the incomplete nature of the information
used to determine which spacecraft are university-class,
and regrets any mistakes.

Many spacecraft with strong university connections do
not fit this definition, especially those where the
university contributes the primary payload. Similarly,
while some spacecraft in the amateur radio service are
university-class, there are many with the OSCAR
designation that do not fit the definition.

Disruptive Technology
As defined by the conference organizers, a disruptive
technology is one that fundamentally alters the way in
which a task is carried out: electronic mail and cell
phones are disrupting society’s approach to business
and communications, as did television did fifty years
ago.
This paper is an investigation of whether
university-built small satellites will disrupt our
approach to space missions. It should be noted that, in
this paper, “disruptive” has positive connotations.

Finally, it should also be noted that NASA’s University
Explorer (UNEX) program sometimes calls its
spacecraft “university-class missions;” none of the
UNEX missions to date fit the above definition of
university-class (though they are not categorically
excluded).

University-Class Satellite
The term “university-class satellite” is preferred over
“student satellite” because the latter has become
nonspecific through overuse; multimillion-dollar
science missions and 3-kg Sputnik re-creations are both
called “student” spacecraft. For the purposes of this
paper, a university-class satellite has three
distinguishing features:
1.

2.

3.

Freedom to Fail
The third concept to define is the “freedom to fail,”
which is so fundamental to the operation of a university
(and at odds with the workings of industry) that it is
often overlooked. Experimental failure is a basic
element of university life; many hypothesis cannot be
tested except through experiment, and it is to be
expected that some hypotheses (and thus some
experiments) will “fail.” Since the primary role of a
university is to advance learning, a “failed” experiment
still yields significant benefits. In the case of student
engineers, the sting of experimental failure is often the
best (or only) teacher.
Thus the term freedom to fail connotes a university’s
inherent freedom to test new concepts within the
context of a learning environment, and the freedom to
employ unusual or risky practice in an attempt to
develop new technologies. However, freedom to fail
does not imply that a university should pursue unsound

It is a self-contained device in Earth orbit with its
own independent means of communications and
command; it can be bolted onto another vehicle
and even draw power from it.
Untrained personnel (i.e. students) performed a
significant fraction of key design decisions,
integration & testing activities, and flight
operations.
The training of these people was as important as
(if not more important) the nominal “mission” of
the spacecraft itself.

Therefore, the significant distinction of a universityclass satellite (as opposed to a space mission with
Swartwout
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of that particular school. Finally, a spacecraft is
indicated to have failed prematurely when its
operational lifetime was significantly less than
published reports predicted and/or if the university who
created the spacecraft indicate that it failed.

practice for the sake of being adventurous (or simply
low-cost); experimental freedom is not incompatible
with reasonable, careful development. It does mean
that a failed experiment (up to and including the loss of
the mission due to failure of the experimental
components) is acceptable.
Up until now, the cost of space missions has severely
limited the missions in which universities could
exercise this freedom. The implications and limitations
of a university’s freedom to fail in the context of space
missions will be discussed in more detail, below.

This list of spacecraft and their respective details is
complete to the best of the author’s ability; certain
aspects are known to be incomplete and are noted as
such. For example, the listed launch masses should be
considered approximate, as the variance in mass among
different published records can reach as high as 50%.
Also, many spacecraft are considered to be
“operational” even when most or all of the primary
payloads and communications equipment are failed or
barely functional; the loss of many spacecraft occurs
without any acknowledgement from their operators.
Therefore, the listed mission duration in months is
approximate.

Paper Overview
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a discussion
of the role of universities in providing disruptive small
satellite missions and technologies. First, a review of
university-class spacecraft launched since 1981 is
provided, including trends in spacecraft design and
performances.
These trends are extrapolated to
consider near-term (5-year) university-class missions.
The capabilities and constraints of university programs
are matched against these emerging technologies to
outline the kinds of unique missions and design
methodologies universities can use to contribute to the
small satellite industry. Finally, this paper will provide
two examples (and one counter-example) of disruptive
university-class missions.

Finally, a special explanation is required regarding the
spacecraft built/supervised by Surrey Satellite
Technology Ltd. (SSTL). This organization has trained
dozens of spacecraft engineers through the design,
integration and operation of spacecraft. These missions
appear to fit the definition of university-class satellites.
However, because of the resources invested, the
capabilities of the spacecraft and the specific training
processes used, most SSTL-class missions fall outside
the intended meaning of “university-class satellite.” To
simplify the discussion, SSTL missions are not included
in Table 1, except for four which fit the university-class
definition (UoSAT 1 & 2, KITSAT-1 and Tsinghua-1).

REVIEW OF UNIVERSITY-CLASS SATELLITES
A list of university-class spacecraft launched between
1981 and 2003 is provided in Table 1. Because the
inclusion or omission of a spacecraft from this list may
prove to be a contentious issue – not to mention the
designation of whether a vehicle failed prematurely, it
is worth discussing the process for creating these tables.

There have been 46 university-class spacecraft
launched between 1981 and 2003 by 28 universities in
15 countries, including 25 spacecraft launched since
2000. In reviewing this list several issues become
immediately apparent. The first is that most universityclass spacecraft are very small (under 50 kg); with the
recent arrival of CubeSat-class spacecraft driving the
averages very low. The second immediate observation
is that university-class spacecraft are less reliable than
their industry counterparts, with about one-third
experiencing significant (or complete) loss of
performance within a few months of launch. Third,
most university-class spacecraft missions could be
categorized as educational or amateur communications;
the 21 missions carrying science or technology (i.e.
potentially-disruptive) payloads tend to be developed
by universities with strong government support.

First, a list of all university-related small satellites that
reached orbit (i.e. not lost to rocket failure) was
assembled from launch logs, the author’s knowledge
and several satellite databases.1,2,3,4 Missions that did
not meet the definition of “university-class” as defined
above were removed from this list. The remaining
spacecraft were researched regarding mission duration,
mass and mission categories, with information derived
from published reports and project websites as
indicated.
A Tech mission flight-tests a new
component or subsystem (new to the satellite industry,
not just new to the university). A Science mission
creates science data relevant to that particular field of
study (including remote sensing). A Comm mission
provides communications services to some part of the
world (often in the Amateur radio service). While
every university-class mission is by definition
educational, those spacecraft listed as Edu missions
lack any of the other payloads and serve mainly to train
students and improve the satellite-building capabilities
Swartwout

One other observation is relevant to the discussion: of
the 28 universities to have participated in developing a
university-class spacecraft, only 9 have developed a
second (a few more schools may join this list before the
end of 2004). It would appear to be very difficult to
build a sustainable spacecraft program.
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Table 1. University-Class Spacecraft Launched Between 1981 and 2003 (references 1,2,3,4 unless noted).
Launch
1981
1984
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1994
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
3000
3001
3002
3003

Spacecraft
Primary School(s)
UoSAT-1 (UO-9)
University of Surrey (UK)
UoSAT-2 (UO-11)
University of Surrey (UK)
NUSAT
Weber State, Utah State University (USA)
WeberSAT (WO-18)
Weber State (USA)
TUBSAT-A
Technical University of Berlin (Germany)
KITSAT-1 (KO-23)
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
KITSAT-2 (KO-25)
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
TUBSAT-B
Technical University of Berlin (Germany)
BremSat
University of Bremen (Germany)
UNAMSAT-B (MO-30) National University of Mexico
Falcon Gold
US Air Force Academy
RS-17
Russian high school students
TUBSAT-N
Technical University of Berlin (Germany)
TUBSAT-N1
Technical University of Berlin (Germany)
Techsat 1-B (GO-32) Technion Institute of Technology (Israel)
SO-33 SEDSAT
University of Alabama, Huntsville (USA)
PO-34 PANSAT
Naval Postgraduate School (USA)
Sunsat (SO-35)
University of Stellenbosch (South Africa)
DLR-TUBSAT
Technical University of Berlin (Germany)
KITSAT-3
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
ASUsat 1
Arizona State University (USA)
Falconsat 1
US Air Force Academy
JAWSAT (WO-39)
Weber State, USAFA
Opal (OO-38)
Stanford University (USA)
JAK
Santa Clara University (USA)
Louise
Santa Clara University (USA)
Thelma
Santa Clara University (USA)
Tsinghua-1
Tsinghua University (China)
SO-41 Saudisat 1A
King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology (Saudia Arabia)
SO-42 Saudisat 1B
King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology (Saudia Arabia)
UNISAT 1
University of Rome "La Sapienza" (Italy)
Munin
Umeå University / Luleå University of Technology (Sweden)
PCSat 1 (NO-44)
US Naval Academy
Sapphire (NO-45)
Stanford, USNA, Washington University (USA)
Maroc-TUBSAT
Technical University of Berlin (Germany)
Kolibri-2000
Space Research Institute (Russia)
SO-50 Saudisat 1C
King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology (Saudia Arabia)
UNISAT 2
University of Rome "La Sapienza" (Italy)
AAU Cubesat
University of Aalborg (Denmark)
CanX-1
University of Toronto (Canada)
CUTE-1
Tokyo Institute of Technology (Japan)
DTUsat
Technical University of Denmark
MOST
University of Toronto (Canada)
QuakeSat
Stanford University (USA)
XI-IV
University of Tokyo (Japan)
STSAT-1
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
Still operational
Semioperational
Nonoperational
Premature loss of operations (or severely degraded operations)

Ref
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
20
20

21
22

11
23
24

25

6

The list of planned launches for 2004 shown in Table 2
indicates the near-term trend in university-class
spacecraft: CubeSats. Almost all of the planned
university-class launches for 2004 (and beyond) are for
these spacecraft, whose launch costs are on the order of
$100,000 for each cube. If this second wave of
CubeSats is successful (3 of 6 CubeSats from the 2003
launch were either never contacted or failed very early),
then many, many CubeSats can be expected in the next
few years. In addition, the overwhelming majority of

Future University-Class Missions
Within the United States, two approaches for
university-class missions now dominate the field: the
1-kg class CubeSat (with its standard P-POD launcher)
and the 15-30 kg class Nanosat. More than 50 schools
are pursuing the former (including many schools
around the world) and about two dozen schools are
involved in building satellites in the latter category.

Swartwout

Mission Primary
Mass Duration Mission
(kg) (months) Type
52
98 Science
60
247 Comm
52
20 Tech
16
97 Comm
35
157 Comm
49
78 Tech
48
98 Comm
40
1 Tech?
63
12 Science
10
0.03 Comm
18
1 Tech
3
2 Edu
9
46 Tech
3
20 Tech
70
52 Science
41
12? Tech
70
68? Comm
64
23 Comm
45
62 Science
110
62 Tech
6
0.03 Edu
52
1 Edu
191
1? Tech
23
53 Tech
0.2
0 Edu
0.5
0 Science
0.5
0 Science
50
48? Edu
10
40? Comm
10
40? Comm
12
?? Edu
6
3 Science
12
33 Comm
20
33 Edu
47
33 Science
21
2 Edu
10
17? Comm
17
18? Edu
1
2 Edu
1
0 Edu
1
12 Edu
1
0 Edu
60
12 Science
3
12? Science
1
12 Edu
100
9? Tech
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proposed CubeSats are pursuing Edu missions, and thus
the CubeSat community still needs to demonstrate the
ability to perform research on this platform.

ARE UNIVERSITY-CLASS SATELLITES
DISRUPTIVE?
To date, no one could argue that university-class
spacecraft have disrupted the approach to space
missions.
(One possible exception has been the
UoSATs, which led to the creation of SSTL and a very
successful string of missions. However, the success of
UoSATs and SSTL has created an important niche for
their company, but has not translated into other
successful programs – yet.) The reasons for the lack of
disruption are apparent: university-class spacecraft are
almost always built with high margins of flight safety
and low margins of performance using established
design practices.
Such spacecraft do not lend
themselves to disruption, because they do not support
new payloads, flight technologies or, most importantly
radically new mission architectures.

The Nanosat category is supported by AFRL and
NASA through design competitions; these schools
attempt to gain government launch sponsorship for a
secondary flight. A team from the first competition,
3CornerSat, will fly several of its spacecraft
constellation on an upcoming Boeing Delta 4 test flight.
The winner of the University Nanosat 3 competition
will get a flight in early 2006.
Outside the U.S., schools are either participating in
CubeSats or, in the case of a few national universities
(Tsinghua, Technical University of Berlin, University
of Rome, KACST, among others), they possess
sufficient government and industrial sponsorship to
continue developing their series of spacecraft.

Many universities pursue spacecraft projects because of
internal motivation; their own faculty and students see
spacecraft as an exciting and relevant way to teach
engineering. The payload (if there is one) is often
defined after the project’s inception, and thus the
payload exists to justify the spacecraft, not the other
way around.

The continuing trend of smaller components has aided
the development university-class spacecraft, especially
in terms of MEMS sensors and processors; these
components will approach the performance abilities of
their larger professional counterparts. However, the
schools have already encountered important constraints
in terms of communications and power, as the antennas,
batteries and solar cells have not (or cannot) follow the
trends of other electronics; in fact, it is not mass as
much as volume that constrains the performance of
future small spacecraft. For the near future, the 10 cm
CubeSat appears to be the practical limit for traditional
spacecraft architectures, and thus the practical limit for
university-class
spacecraft
using
traditional
architectures.

Those universities attempting to fly “real” payloads
face a different chicken-and-egg problem:
the
developers of real payloads are justifiably hesitant to
risk their components on these new spacecraft, yet
without a real payload, the universities cannot the gain
flight experience necessary to attract real payloads.
And even with a real payload, universities still have the
challenge of finding an affordable launch.

Table 2. Planned University-Class Launches in 2004.
Spacecraft
Naxing-1 (NS-1)
CP1
CP2
HAUSAT-1
ICE CUBE1
ICE CUBE2
ION
KUTESat-Pathfinder
Mea Huaka'i
MEROPE
Ncube
Rincon
SACRED
SEEDS
UNISAT 3
SaudiSat 2
3 CornerSat: Sparky
3 CornerSat: Petey
3 CornerSat: Ralphie

Swartwout

Primary School(s)
Tsinghua University (China)
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo (USA)
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo (USA)
Hankuk Aviation University
Cornell University (USA)
Cornell University (USA)
University of Illinois (USA)
University of Kansas (USA)
University of Hawaii (USA)
Montana State University (USA)
Norwegian Universites
University of Arizona (USA)
University of Arizona (USA)
Nihon University (Japan)
University of Rome (Italy)
KACST (Saudia Arabia)
Arizona State University (USA)
New Mexico State University (USA)
Colorado University - Boulder (USA)
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Mass
(kg)
25
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
15?
15
15
15

Launch
Date
April
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
August
July
July
September
September
September
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question, let us first examine the three main types of
payloads carried by university-class missions:

The underlying issue in all of these obstacles is cost:
access to space is extremely expensive. Because the
cost-per-kilogram of launching spacecraft is so high,
spacecraft must be extremely reliable and have a
compelling mission. Proper development, integration
and testing require significant infrastructure. Therefore,
it has been extremely difficult for universities without
significant (usually government) sponsorship to
complete and launch their own spacecraft.

1.

2.

In the 1990s, the electronics revolution allowed the
development of moderately-capable small spacecraft
using commercial-grade electronics. Universities were
deeply involved in developing these electronics and
their implementation in communications, robotics, and
other systems. At this time, the belief began to
circulate that university-built spacecraft could be lowcost alternatives to professional vehicles. This belief
has not proven to be true. University-class spacecraft
(i.e. missions where student training is paramount) are
not low-cost alternatives because of the resources spent
to train the students, and because of the unavoidable
mistakes and delays that come from student
involvement. While students work considerably more
cheaply than professional engineers, their productivity
per man-hour is considerably lower, and their work
schedule suffers from a significant number of breaks
and distractions (e.g., exams).

3.

However, as mentioned above, none of these
approaches are necessarily well-suited to creating
disruptive space missions; they are traditional missions
pursued by university students (and thus often subject
to even stricter flight-safety constraints than their
professional counterparts).
Therefore, it is not
surprising that these university spacecraft look and
behave like less-capable versions of traditional
spacecraft.
Because of these constraints, one should not expect
university-class spacecraft to “disrupt” the space
industry on their own. Student-built systems cannot be
built on the same scope or scale as professional
spacecraft; students and programs that can do so end up
starting their own professional spacecraft companies
(and abandoning the constraining university-class
spacecraft approach). The most effective way for
universities to contribute to the disruption of the space
industry is by building research platforms for disruptive
concepts and technologies, particularly high-risk/highreturn missions and novel architectures.

Therefore, lacking compelling payloads and lacking the
resources to attract compelling payloads, most
university-class spacecraft have marginal science or
engineering return, focusing instead on student training.
Clearly, there is nothing wrong with this approach;
many students (the author included) have benefited
greatly from hands-on engineering experience on these
“payload-less” missions. However, as shown in Table
1, most universities with education-only satellites have
only built one spacecraft; whatever time, money,
personnel and enthusiasm came together to create the
first spacecraft were not available to try a second, and
the program ended.

Universities are in a unique position to pursue high-risk
missions because of their freedom to fail; any
university-class mission “succeeds” when students gain
practical education in spacecraft engineering. Thus, a
high-risk spacecraft that fails in orbit still succeeds
from the university perspective; success of the flight
experiment would be an added bonus.

While several university programs do have sufficient
credibility and sponsorship to pursue traditional
research payloads, these projects have tended not to be
disruptive; in order to secure a launch these spacecraft
carefully follow the traditional constraints of reliability,
cost, and performance. In other words, these programs
are part of the traditional (i.e. non-disruptive) approach
to space missions. There is nothing wrong with this
approach, either; they simply aren’t pursuing disruptive
research.

As with the other mission types, the fundamental
obstacle to using university-class spacecraft for highrisk research platforms is cost; universities can afford to
fly a failed mission, but launch sponsors cannot.
Unless the cost of building, launching and operating
university-class spacecraft can be dramatically reduced,
there will be only limited opportunity for universities to

Could University-Class Satellites be “Disruptive?”
So, is it at all possible for university-class spacecraft to
disrupt the spacecraft industry?
To answer that
Swartwout

A simple, low-to-moderate-utility payload that
has little interest outside the program (except for
possible amateur use). Low-resolution
commercial cameras and environmental sensors
are examples of this category. Most universityclass satellites fall into this category (for lack of
resources, as discussed above).
A traditional science payload, such as a highresolution telescope. Few university-class
spacecraft have carried such payloads, lacking the
performance (e.g. pointing control) and/or
reliability.
An experimental component or concept to flight
qualify. This category is the engineering analog
to the previous category, and suffers from the
same constraints.
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smaller and less expensive, further improving the
launch performance.

participate in disruptive spacecraft development. Such
reductions have four requirements:
very small
spacecraft, common launch interfaces, short-duration
nominal missions and large operational margins. These
will be discussed in turn.

Large operational margins. These are student-built
spacecraft, which means that design and fabrication
errors may exist, and these are high-risk spacecraft,
which means that conceptual errors may exist. It is
essential to mitigate the effects of these errors by
building spacecraft with significant margins in mass,
power, computation, pointing and communications.
Students should not be expected to design and build
spacecraft that push the state-of-the-practice in
performance without giving them significant margins in
cost, schedule and flight operations.

Small spacecraft. Generally speaking, the lower the
spacecraft mass, the lower the cost of the launch.
However, this is only true for orders-of-magnitude
changes in launch mass (1000 kg vs. 100 kg vs. 10 kg)
and for primary payloads; a 10 kg spacecraft may not
cost any less to fly in a secondary opportunity than a 30
kg vehicle, and the real launch costs for very small
vehicles are driven by integration, flight safety and
documentation expenses. Still, spacecraft less than 50
cm on a side and under 30 kg have a wider range of
secondary launch opportunities than larger spacecraft.

EXAMPLES OF ‘DISRUPTIVE’MISSIONS
Three examples of university-class satellites (two in
flight, one in development) will help illustrate the kinds
of missions that are well-suited for disruptive
university-class research programs.

Also, a smaller spacecraft improves mission reliability;
a small vehicle means fewer parts and fewer interfaces,
which improves the ability to comprehensively review
and test every design, component and interface before
launch. Structural performance benefits from the
smaller frame; natural frequencies increase and bending
moments decrease with decreased size. Therefore, it is
easier for a very small student-built spacecraft to pass
flight safety reviews.

Disruptive Mission - Opal
The Orbiting Picosatellite Automated Launcher (OPAL,
or, as commonly used, Opal) mission began in 1994 at
Stanford University, and was launched in January 2000
on a Minotaur rocket as part of the JAWSAT mission.19
Shown in Figure 1, Opal is a 23 kg hexagonal prism
made of aluminum honeycomb carrying COTS
electronics. Opal’s primary mission was to demonstrate
deployable spacecraft technologies; six hockey-puck
sized “picosatellites” (PICOSAT 1 & 2, StenSat,
Thelma, Louise, JAK) were deployed from Opal
several days after launch. In addition to its primary
mission, Opal conducted magnetometer hardware
testing and acted as an Amateur radio repeater.

Common launch interfaces. The spacecraft-to-launch
vehicle interface is one of the most reviewed and riskprone aspects of the mission, especially for universityclass spacecraft. Costs can be significantly decreased
and reliability significantly increased through the use of
common interfaces and form factors across university
missions.
For these reasons, common interfaces have already
been developed for several
types of university
spacecraft. Extremely small (1 kg) spacecraft have two
standardized interfaces:
the P-POD launcher for
CubeSats and the DoD launcher built for the MEPSI
program. AFRL and NASA have required the standard
use of Lightband for their Nanosats.
Very short duration missions. Choosing missions
that can be accomplished in short durations (90 days or
less) has two benefits. The reduced scope allows for
higher-risk, lower-cost/mass components and higherrisk practices that are consistent with a short mission.
For example, powerful and inexpensive COTS
processors tend to be radiation-sensitive; reduced
mission times will reduce their potential exposure. On
the education side, a shorter-duration mission tends to
be simpler from both a development and operations
side, which gives students greater opportunities to see
an entire mission from concept through operations.
Both of these effects tend to make the spacecraft

Swartwout

Figure 1. Opal [courtesy Stanford SSDL].
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The “disruptive” contribution of the Opal mission has
two aspects. First, the picosat launcher was a research
experiment for potentially disruptive technologies; the
PICOSAT spacecraft were the first flight of a DARPA/
Aerospace Corporation program for extremely small
spacecraft and MEMS communications technologies.
The success of the Opal mission was followed by
another PICOSAT flight on MightySat 2.1 and led to
the MEMS-Based PICOSAT Inspector (MEPSI) flight
program, which will develop “on-board, on-call”
miniature inspectors to improve long-term operations.
Since MEPSI is still in development, it is impossible to
know how MEPSI-class inspectors will affect the future
of spacecraft development. However, Opal was an
important, low-cost “proof of concept” experiment that
enabled this program to proceed.

The author served as Sapphire’s project manager at
Stanford and is Sapphire’s primary operator.
Shown in Figure 3, Sapphire is a 20-kg satellite whose
primary flight mission was to flight-test a set of MEMS
infrared detectors. A student-modified COTS camera
and voice synthesizer were also included, and Sapphire
carries software to perform autonomous health
management.29
Sapphire is an example of the traditional universityclass spacecraft, where the primary reason to create the
spacecraft was the student training itself. Sapphire’s
lack of compelling flight mission led to the 3-year delay
in securing a launch, and its primary function on-orbit
has been as spacecraft operations training tool for
students at many universities. While the student
training is an important mission, it is not disruptive.

On the university side, Stanford and Cal Poly teamed to
improve Opal’s picosat launcher concept for future
university-class spacecraft, resulting in the P-POD
launcher concept for 10 cm cube, 1-kg CubeSats.27,28 A
half-dozen CubeSats were launched on one Dnepr
rocket in 2003, with more than a dozen CubeSats
planned for a 2004 launch.
The CubeSat project has already “disrupted” the way
that university-class missions are pursued. Only 28
universities have built their own spacecraft since 1981
(including 4 building CubeSats); almost every one of
the 10 schools intending to fly CubeSats by the end of
2004 are building their first spacecraft, and more than
50 schools around the world are in the process of
building their own CubeSats. Because of Opal, many
more universities are using spacecraft projects as
classroom teaching tools.

Figure 3. Sapphire.
Potentially Disruptive Mission – Bandit
Figure 2. P-POD [courtesy Cal Poly].

The third example mission is in development at
Washington University in St. Louis (WU), where the
author serves as principal investigator. In many
respects, this mission builds on the lessons learned from
Sapphire and Opal. The Bandit program has been
scoped in size and purpose to maximize student
learning and flight opportunities. The Bandit mission
is to demonstrate key enabling technologies for
inspector spacecraft:
repeatable docking, close

Non-Disruptive Mission – Sapphire
In contrast to Opal, the Sapphire satellite has not proven
to be a “disruptive” mission. Sapphire was also a
Stanford project, started in 1994 and completed in
1998. Lacking a launch sponsor or compelling payload,
Sapphire, was donated to the U.S. Naval Academy as a
training tool in 2000 and selected by the DoD for a
launch in 2001 as part of NASA’s Kodiak Star mission.
Swartwout
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maneuvering near a parent vehicle, and automatic,
image-based navigation. These technologies will be
tested in phases, with total flight time on the order of
hours.30 The docking structure for the conical Bandit
inspector is shown in Figure 4.

to educate and motivate students in all
spacecraft engineering.
However, the
constraints that come with building
spacecraft have proven to be very taxing,
very few universities have had sustained
building activities.

Bandit is the lead experiment for WU’s Akoya
nanosatellite, which is part of the AFRL/NASA
University Nanosat 3 competition. Since Bandit will
operated in and around the WU-built Akoya spacecraft,
mission designers have greater freedom to incorporate
high-risk (but low-cost, low-mass, high-reward)
designs. For example, the all-WU mission gives Bandit
more tolerance for possible impacting, tumbling and
other effects of missed docking. In other words,
Bandit’s “freedom to fail” extends to its potentially
damaging effects on the parent spacecraft. Such
freedom is unlikely to exist when another party owns
the parent vehicle, but is essential for initial flight
demonstrations.

One reason for the lack of sustained programs is the
relevance of the spacecraft payload (or lack thereof).
Universities can gather the support and resources to
sponsor one education-only mission, but can rarely do
that for two. The inevitable pressures of cost and
schedule and the difficulties in maintaining continuity
with regular student turnover are particularly
challenging problems for university programs.
The electronics revolution has created new
opportunities for university-class spacecraft; reasonably
capable spacecraft can be designed and integrated
within a student “lifetime” at very low cost (tens of
thousands of dollars). The only real cost of the mission
is the launch campaign – and these extremely small
components lend themselves to extremely small
spacecraft, reducing those costs as well.

The Bandit inspector, dock and flight electronics are
less than 3 kg in mass and requiring less than 2 W of
power on average. The system is modular, allowing it
to be integrated onto other platforms as flight
opportunities arise. Also, the experimental plan is
incremental, meaning that the entire flight experiment
could be conducted over several missions, if needed.

The advent of extremely small, short-developmentcycle, low-cost spacecraft provides an opportunity for
universities to apply their unique strengths to spacecraft
research: the enthusiasm and novel ideas of students
and the freedom to fail. University-class spacecraft are
an ideal way to test radically new technologies and
architectures, for university-class spacecraft are the
most risk-tolerant programs in the space industry.

If successful, the Bandit mission would be disruptive by
demonstrating that autonomous, image-navigated
spacecraft could be produced at a very low cost. On a
larger scale, the Bandit mission (and others like it) are
disruptive by demonstrating that real spacecraft
engineering research can be performed at universities.

There is an important difference between mission risk
and flight safety risk; for university-class spacecraft to
succeed, this difference must be clearly identified by
both universities and their launch sponsors. Spacecraft
designs or practices that lead to unsafe vehicle behavior
during launch or separation poses a threat to the entire
launch campaign and should be managed using wellestablished design, integration and test practices. These
practices are completely compatible with disruptive
university-class missions.
Mission risk, on the other hand, are those designs or
practices that do not pose a flight safety risk but might
threaten the on-orbit performance of the vehicle. While
mission risk should be minimized, many important
demonstrations of new, disruptive technologies will
carry significant mission risk (e.g. the Bandit),
especially if they are to be attempted within the
constraints of a university-class spacecraft. In the
author’s experience, mission managers and flight safety
engineers often do not distinguish between flight risk
and mission risk; failing to draw this distinction places
additional, unnecessary burdens on the university
development team. Much work remains to be done to

Figure 4. Bandit Dock.
CONCLUSIONS
Universities around the world have discovered that
hands-on student satellite projects are an excellent way
Swartwout
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convince design reviewers to allow universities to carry
their own mission risk.

2.

Perhaps the most interesting development in the history
of university-class spacecraft has been the rise of the
CubeSat projects; more schools are presently
developing CubeSats than the total number of previous
university-class spacecraft. As discussed above, it
remains to be seen whether this extremely small
platform can produce reliable research platforms.

3.
4.
5.

This paper has considered the question of universityclass spacecraft as disruptive research platforms
without specifying many possible disruptions. The
main reason for this is a recognition of the author’s
inability to predict future events. However, it is
interesting to consider that the aspect of the space
industry that is most likely to be “disrupted” by
university-class spacecraft is the small satellite industry
itself; CubeSats and Nanosats, if properly developed,
may introduce completely new missions for small
spacecraft and completely new ways to design, build
and operate these vehicles.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Finally, the work of this paper emphasized the
engineering role of universities in developing disruptive
technologies. As mentioned in the introduction, the
university also plays a significant science/payload
development role in all space missions. It would be a
worthwhile investigation to learn why university
researchers opt for large satellites over small.

10.
11.
12.
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